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Abstract
This article argues that despite presiding over a failed economy, the Zimbabwe African Union Patriotic
Front (ZANU PF) led by Robert Mugabe, has willing and enthusiastic supporters. There are claims that the
large crowds witnessed singing and dancing at ZANU PF rallies are mobilized by force because the
attendees do not benefit anything from supporting the regime. In a divergence from the consensus of the
literature, this article surfaces other explanations than coercion for the huge turnout at rallies, rented
crowds, handouts, and well-articulated election manifestos. The psychological dimension, especially the
fundamentalist mindset created by instrumentalist nationalism, is one such other perspective to clarifying
why this is the case. It might also explain why some Zimbabweans are so susceptible to compliance with
power relations that subordinate them. Thus, a psychological dimension is added to the level of analysis
beyond the often resorted to socio-economic and political explanations for political mobilization. Willing
and enthusiastic support is not to be necessarily judged by ZANU PF’s winning or losing elections, or the
number of supporters it has, but more by the effervescence observed at rallies and other political
activities. The article interrogates ZANU PF’s instrumentalist nationalism through both religious and nonreligious lenses, such as the education system, media, church platforms, music, history and culture, galas,
and its usual political campaigns.
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Subject Formation, Fundamentalism, and Instrumentalist Nationalism
in Zimbabwean Politics
Joram Tarusarira
While many have dismissed the notion that President Robert Mugabe’s regime still has
enthusiastic supporters (Kriger, 2005), this article argues that indeed it does, as shown by the
effervescence at ZANU PF rallies and other events. Far more than coercion, rented crowds,
handouts, and well-articulated election manifestos, the fundamentalist mindset created by
instrumentalist nationalism is integral to clarifying why this is the case, and further, why some
Zimbabweans are so susceptible to compliance with power relations that subordinate them
and have mismanaged the economy, thereby making their lives miserable. Deploying the
concept of fundamentalism to analyze instrumentalist nationalism is of fresh conceptual
value. It brings a psychosocial lens through which to study nationalism—a topic dominated
by political economy. The fundamentalist framework illuminates understandings of the
workings of beliefs, emotions and attitudes, which are often overlooked in the body politic.
The concept of fundamentalism has been applied to religious groups, movements, and
discourses, such that it would be anathema to discuss political discourses within the context of
fundamentalism. A critical analysis of the psychological nature of fundamentalism, especially
its potency to create “apocalyptic” subjects, illuminates understanding on the phenomenon of
passionate attachment to power that subjects. ZANU PF instrumentalist nationalist discourse,
and its vision and version of a Zimbabwe and Africa that President Mugabe was to deliver,
has become an apocalypse that captivates its followers. The resonance of the fundamentalist
mind and instrumentalist nationalism intimates that fundamentalism is a concept transcending
religious circumscriptions where it has its provenance. This article interrogates ZANU PF’s
instrumentalist nationalism through both religious and non-religious lenses such as the
education system, media, church platforms, music, history and culture, galas, and its usual
political campaigns. The argument of this article is not about ZANU PF’s winning or losing
elections, or necessarily about the numbers of people who attend rallies, but about those
people who still support it enthusiastically. The article asks why those who support ZANU
PF continue to do so passionately and fervently, despite ZANU PF presiding over a failed
economy, and failing to deliver political goods.
Fundamentalism and Its Effects
Though its tenets are contested, some general characteristics of fundamentalism can be
identified from within the religious discourse. These include the perception that it is a

reaction to secularism, rationalism, and modernity. However, modernity is accepted where it
does not contradict some basic religious principles. Fundamentalism creates boundaries. It
has a tendency to form strong identities exclusive of others and thus divide people into them
and us; it divides people into friends and enemies, good and evil. It erects boundaries
between those who are members and those who are not. These boundaries can be physical,
but often the barriers are social, psychological, and behavioural, which is why some have
argued that fundamentalism produces a particular intensity of non-rational or irrational
passion not subject to the firm control of reason. Fundamentalists are driven by fervor, rage,
passion, fanaticism, and zeal—making religious fundamentalism absolutist, self-righteous,
arrogant, dogmatic, and intolerant of compromise (Cavanaugh, 2009, pp. 18-26). Members
try to associate with their own and avoid outsiders as much as is possible. They may develop
particular modes of dress, behaviour, speech (Almond, Appleby, & Sivan, 2003; Marty &
Appleby, 1991) enforced in their communities—sometimes violently (Sprinzak, 1991). They
develop their own independent social institutions such as traditional religious institutions,
schools, community centres, businesses, and burial societies. They tend to have a black and
white view of the world. That is, there is right and wrong, good and evil, insiders and
outsiders, salvation and damnation. The boundaries are clear and there is no room for shades
of grey. Fundamentalists believe in elect membership, with them as the chosen ones.
Subsequently, they have exclusive access to truth, and this feeling cements the boundaries
between them and others. They believe in the inerrancy of, and focus on, their text.
Theological innovation is permitted only when a religion in its old format is challenged by
modernity and is no longer defending the group. Hence religion’s central tenets and
ideologies are reinterpreted to meet the present challenges.
One method of theological innovation is a selective emphasis on doctrines (see
Bourdieu, 1991). Fundamentalists tend to focus on a utopian golden age of religion when
their belief system was allegedly pure and perfect. There is desire to go back to the mythical
age of the past. According to Soloveitchik (1994), “This history filters out untoward facts and
glosses over the darker aspects of the past. Indeed, it often portrays events as they did not
happen” (p. 82). Fundamentalist leaders have authority over political, economic and personal
issues, and their opinion is sought and followed in all major decisions of life.
Fundamentalism is often associated with male-dominated societies where women are
expected to defer to men. One of the concerns of fundamentalists is that modernity is
undermining traditional gender roles (Fox, 2013, pp. 109-115).

Fundamentalism creates subjects who espouse a mind, which inter alia, emphasizes
certainty and the black and white distinction of worldview, and smacks of absolutisms already
suggested. This is the point at which subject formation enters. Absolutist and apocalyptic
knowledge produce apocalyptic subjects. Associated with absolutism is the sense of
uniqueness and finality. Thus, if particular knowledge is deposited within a people, and it
determines their existence, it is power. This is so because people become dependent on that
knowledge. Thus, that upon which one depends is considered to have power over him or her.
No wonder Butler (1997) points out that “power is not simply what we oppose, but also, in a
strong sense, what we depend on for our existence and what we harbour and preserve in the
beings that we are” (p. 2). So when a form of knowledge or information is impressed upon a
people, an inner life is produced in the process of subject formation through various societal
institutions. Subjection produces a radical ambivalence in which the individual emerges
through a passionate attachment to his or her own subordination (Butler, 1997). This
ambivalence is evident in how the subject may find himself or herself loving the oppressor,
who under normal circumstances would be hated. The subject has a passionate attachment
with the oppressor, thus feelings of attraction and resentment are existing simultaneously.
The Discourse of Instrumentalist Nationalism
Nationalism is as contested, with various scholars emphasizing different aspects, and
possesses different implications for its study. One scholar writes,
Those who define [nationalism] as an idea will focus on the writings and speeches of
nationalist intellectuals or activists; those who see it as a sentiment will concentrate on
the development of language or other shared ways of life and try to see how these
“folk ways” are taken up by the intelligentsia or the politicians; finally those who treat
nationalism as a movement will focus on political action and conflict. (Ozikrimli,
2000, p. 58)
It is a discourse that constantly shapes our consciousness and the way we constitute the
meaning of the world. It determines our collective identity by producing and reproducing us
as “nationals.” It is a way of seeing and interpreting that conditions our daily speech,
behaviors, and attitudes (Ozikrimili, 2000, p. 4). Its power comes from its capacity to create
an identity based on emotion and the irrational (Langman, 2006). It can already be seen that
nationalism, therefore, has the capacity to produce a fundamentalist mind. Hence there is a
significant resonance between the two discourses.

In step with theological innovation of fundamentalism, Brass (1991) notes that under
nationalism, “cultures are fabricated by elites whose aims are ensuring economic or political
advantages for themselves” (p. 8). When nationalism becomes an instrument to gain power, it
becomes instrumentalist nationalism. According to Hobsbawm (1994), the nation and its
associated phenomena, including nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, and histories
are a result of social engineering, which are often deliberate and always innovative. He
created the concept of “invention of traditions” (Hobsbawn, 2004): a set of practices normally
governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and rituals of a symbolic nature, which inculcate
certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, thereby automatically implying
continuity with the past. All these are efforts for what Foucault (1977) and Althusser (1971)
call “subjectivation” (subject formation) and “intepellation,” respectively. Subjectivation is a
Foucaldian philosophical concept that refers to the construction of an individual subject; it is
an identity forming process, and nationalism is part of such a process. According to Foucault,
the modern era’s forces of disciplinary power and normalization turn individuals into subjects.
The individual is a result of strategic power relations (Allen, 2009). “Intepellation” was first
coined by Louis Althusser to describe the process by which ideology produces the individual
as a subject through “Ideological State Apparatuses” that include religion, education, the
family, the law, politics, culture, and the media. These institutions produce the ideologies
within which we assume identities and become subjects. When ideologies and ideology work
well, they are lived as if they were obvious and natural (Althusser, 1971; Ndlovu-Gathseni
2009). Thus, in the case of ZANU PF supporters going to rallies, supporting the party,
singing and dancing become obvious and natural. Giddens (1985) refers to nationalism as
“primarily psychological…the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs
emphasising communality among the members of a political order” (p. 116). He proceeds to
note that sentiments of group identity at all times and all places are exclusionary. How a
group is thought of, and how they define themselves, depends upon the traits attributed to
outsiders.
Instrumentalist Nationalism and the Zimbabwean State Since the 1990s
Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980. The discourse of nationalism soon
followed. National unity was the buzz word in the political discourse, such that any move to
oppose the ruling regime was confronted in the name of nationalism. The 1982 massacres
witnessed in the Matabeleland and Midlands provinces exemplified allegations that dissidents
there threatened national unity (Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace, 1997), and resulted
in the Unity Accord of 1987, when ZANU merged with Zimbabwe People’s Union (ZAPU)

to form ZANU PF. This development was based on Mugabe’s advocacy for a one partystate—a position that was contested by ZANU PF’s former Secretray General, Edgar Tekere
(1937-2011), who challenged a one-party state as never one of the founding principles of
ZANU-PF, and further argued that experience in Africa had shown a one-party state brought
the evils of nepotism, corruption,and inefficiency (Masunungure, 2004, p. 159). Tekere went
on to form his own party called the Zimbabwe Unity Movement. When the 1990 elections,
according to the electoral commission, presented a loss for Tekere, he faded out of public
view and was later alleged to have reconciled with ZANU PF. When he died he was buried at
the national heroes acre, a space reserved only for Mugabe’s trusted cadres from the liberation
struggle.
ZANU PF encountered an unprecedented electoral challenge by a new political party,
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which emerged in 1999. Faced with this
challenge, ZANU PF tilted the goal of nationalism from a focus on national unity to regime
security. Nationalism became an instrument for keeping ZANU PF in power. Deliberate
strategies were deployed for this purpose, such as the media, religious institutions, musical
galas, education, youth (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). The MDC gained popularity, due to ZANU
PF’s socio-economic and political mismanagement in the 1990s (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).
Faced with an electorate that had lost trust, ZANU PF resorted to instrumentalist nationalism
to stay in power.
In the 1990s, Zimbabwe experienced a declining economy against the global economic
liberalization, which prompted it to adopt the Economic Structural Adjustment Program
(ESAP) from international financial institutions. Unfortunately the program resulted in the
negative effects of deceleration of economic growth, employment decreases, high inflation,
and other issues (Kanyenze, 2004). Its social impact included increased suffering of the
ordinary person, loss of jobs, reduced incomes, and the crumbling of social services. This
prompted the citizens to be disillusioned with the government. The decline of workers’
incomes led to a series of nationwide strikes by the labor movement, represented by the
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), between 1996 and 1998 (Kanyenze, 2004).
The ZCTU was a key member of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), a new
umbrella body of non-governmental organizations, that located the Zimbabweans’ crisis
within the constitution. Out of the NCA was born the MDC in 1999.
As previously pointed out, fundamentalists develop their own independent social
institutions, such as traditional religious institutions, schools, community centers, businesses,
or burial societies. ZANU PF did not establish its own institutions per se, but usurped those

of the state to defend itself from the threat of the MDC. A National Youth training scheme
was launched in August 2001 (allegedly) to teach the youth patriotism, unity and oneness,
national identity, discipline and self-reliance (Smith, 2005). In actual fact, they were
indoctrinated with exclusively ZANU-PF campaign materials and speeches, including an
anthology of Mugabe’s speeches titled Inside the Third Chimurenga (liberation struggle).
The system used crude propaganda, violence, and intimidation to manipulate youth into
thinking that their own impunity and abuse of power was part of the struggle to protect
ZANU-PF and Zimbabwe from foreign influence (Smith, 2005). The youth became in
Foucauldian terms (Foucault, 1977, p. 138) a machinery of power—docile bodies compelled
to operate under the techniques, speed and efficiency the regime wished. Interviewed youth
members revealed:
Our source of power was this encouragement we were getting, particularly from the
police and others…it was instilled in us that whenever we go out, we are free to do
whatever we want and nobody was going to question that. (Solidarity Peace Trust,
2003) [italics my own]
In endorsing the same report of Solidarity Peace Trust (2003), the church leaders of southern
Africa lamented:
Having been thoroughly brain-washed, the youth militias are deployed to carry out
whatever instructions they receive from their political commissars, on the
understanding that they will never be called to account by this regime for any of their
deeds. (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2003) [italics my own]
A National and Strategic Studies Program was introduced in Teacher’s and Technical
colleges, purportedly to foster a desire to participate in national development and equip the
students with the relevant skills (Ministries of Education Sports & Culture & Higher
Education, 2004). To the contrary, the course was fundamentalist, devoid of objective and
critical thinking, lacking the ability for students to question things or reason for themselves.
Reports have indicated that the militia became one of the most commonly reported violators
of human rights, with accusations against them including murder, torture, rape, and
destruction of property (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2003).
Reminiscent of fundamentalism’s ingroup and outgroup strategy, the racial divide
began to emerge. White commercial farmers experienced violent invasion of their farms.
They were labelled colonialist enemies of the state and of blacks, cheats, and dishonest people

uncommitted to the national cause (Alexander, 2004; Meredith, 2003). In the rural areas,
ZANU PF youths and war veterans convened meetings where huge crowds sang and danced
to revolutionary songs in support of ZANU PF. Those who attended were categorized as
members of ZANU PF, and those who did not, as opposition members. In a fundamentalist
context, members associate with their own and avoid the outgroup. This segues into the
politics of inclusion and exclusion, which is a tactic that has been deployed by ZANU PF
since pre-independence times. Dissenting voices were simply named and categorized as
vatengesi (sellouts), a term that was used to describe those who collaborated with the colonial
Rhodesia Front (RF). The term also refered to anyone in solidarity with Zimbabwe People’s
Revolutionary Army or Rhodesian Forces (Dzimiri et al., 2014). The characteristics of a
fundamentalist discourse can be identified in the nationalist discourse: creation of boundaries,
absolutism, divisiveness, and member inclusion and exclusion—particular forms of behaviour
enforced by institutions, eclecticism, and authoritarianism.
The state media disseminated propaganda. It spread messages against the opposition
MDC, civil society, and non-governmental organizations to further the interests of the ZANU
PF regime. Fundamentalist, propagandist, and particularistic messages were repeated in both
electronic and print media. The media fueled division and enmity between people and
solidified negative beliefs and attitudes between those who harbored different political ideas.
Typical of fundamentalism, people were divided into the good and the bad. The ruling party
cadres and enthusiasts labelled those who did not agree with their political ideology enemies
of the state, allies of western forces, or Western-sponsored traitors seeking a return to white
rule. As the people listened to the radio, watched television, and read government controlled
newspapers they were “informed” about what it means to be a good Zimbabwean and a
genuine African (Raftopoulos, 2004).
The Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation launched in 2001 its new mission to
“provide world class quality programs and services that reflect, develop, foster and respect the
Zimbabwean national identity, character, cultural diversity, national aspirations and
Zimbabwean and pan-African values” (Chiumbu, 2004). Nationalist programs such as
National Ethos and Nhaka Yedu (our heritage) which were meant to reawaken Zimbabweans
from colonial nightmare into a more essentialist African consciousness (Raftopolous, 2004)
were introduced in the state media. To bolster this strategy, as Tendi (2010) observed,
Zimbabwean nationalist “public” revisionist intellectuals branded opposition forces as
western “puppets.” While the effectiveness of the media on fundamentalist loyalty cannot be
established mathematically, the presence of ZANU PF messages and jingles in the public

sphere, and how the jingles were played at rallies, might be a way to discern the impact of the
media. Ordinary party enthusiasts developed their arguments for the party-based
propagandist information aired on radio and television. For instance it became common for
ZANU PF supporters to blame the poor performance of the economy on sanctions imposed on
Zimbabwe. This was the argument endlessly aired on radio or television, or written in
newspapers. Many voters take what appears in print and electronic media for the truth.
As has been noted, one of the characteristics of fundamentalism is theological
innovation whereby a religion in its old format, when challenged by modernity, reinterprets its
central tenets and ideologies to meet the new challenges. One method of theological
innovation is a selective emphasis on doctrines. ZANU-PF turned to Zimbabwe’s liberation
story and Zimbabwe’s “golden past.” It conscripted elements of history which it believed
would generate support and undermine opposition elements. Themes and events which did
not serve ZANU-PF’s agenda were downplayed or misrepresented (Tendi, 2010). The
strategy can be demonstrated by the treatment of former vice-president Joice Mujuru. Since
independence Mujuru was said to have downed a helicopter with a machine gun on 17
February 1974. When she fell out of favour with the ruling regime, history was “re-written.”
That claim was revoked and said to be a hoax (Staff Reporter, 2014). The state broadcaster
stopped using the “comrade” honorific and referred to her simply as “Mrs Mujuru.” The title
“comrade” is reserved for those who joined the struggle to end white rule in the 1970s, and
who remain loyal to the party in general, and President Robert Mugabe in particular
(Thornycroft, 2015).
Manifesting another classic tactic of fundamentalists, history curriculum in schools
began to emphasize the history and pride of Zimbabwe. Ranger (2003) called it patriotic
history and has noted its narrowing focus, its resentment of “disloyal” historical questions, its
antagonism towards academic history, and that it is highly politically charged.
Instrumentalist nationalism has thus been a form of a fundamentalist religion from a
functional perspective. As Gentile posited, “A ‘religion of politics’ is a system of beliefs,
myths, rituals and symbols that interpret and define the meaning and end of human existence
by subordinating the destiny of individuals and the collectivity to a supreme entity” (2006, p.
xiv). This does not refer to a theocracy where the state subordinates to a traditional religion.
A religion of politics creates an “aura of sacredness around an entity belonging to this world”
(Gentile, 2006., p. 76). This entity might be an individual leader or a political party. It is of
two kinds, namely political and civil religion. Political religion applies to totalitarian regimes,
such as the Zimbabwean state, during times of threat from mass democracy. The political

system gets sacralized, founded on an unchangeable monopoly of power, ideological monism,
and the obligatory and unconditional subordination of the individual and the collectivity to its
code of commandments. Civil religion is defined as a form of sacralization that guarantees a
plurality of ideas, free competition in the exercise of power, and the ability of the governed to
dismiss their governments through peaceful and constitutional means. The distinction,
however, is not hermetic (Cavanaugh, 2009, pp. 109-110). Civil religion can become political
religion when regimes are under threat, and political religion can be toned down during times
of less or no threat to the regimes. As already intimated, the type of the religion in Zimbabwe
is not civil, but political religion. While nationalism itself was political religion, the reach
into traditional religions, especially Christianity and African religion, strengthened its
fundamentalist character and made the instrumental fundamentalism more conspicuous.
According to the 2012 census estimate, Zimbabwe has a population of 13 million
people. Eighty-four (84) percent of the population is Christian divided as follows: thirty-three
(33) percent Catholic; forty-two (42) percent evangelical or Pentecostal; seventeen (17)
percent Anglican, Methodist, or Presbyterian, and eight (8) percent apostolic. There are a
significant number of independent Pentecostal and syncretic African churches. The majority
of the population also adheres to varying degrees to indigenous religions. Approximately
three (3) percent of the population is Muslim—primarily immigrants of Mozambican and
Malawian descent. The Muslim population is concentrated in rural areas and in some highdensity suburbs. Small numbers of Greek Orthodox, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, and the Bahai
faith make up less than one (1) percent of the population. Political elites tend to be members
of established Christian mainstream or Pentecostal churches (U.S. Department of State, 2012).
As Berger (1967) notes “religion legitimates social institutions by bestowing upon
them an ultimately valid ontological status, which is locating them within a sacred and cosmic
frame of reference” (p. 33). To obey political authority is to be in the right relationship with
the world of the gods (p. 34). Society and the cosmos are understood as having a microcosm macrocosm relationship. The parallel extends to specific roles, understood as mimetic
reiterations of the cosmic realities which they represent (p. 38). This helps to maintain the
status quo. Religious legitimation involves the transformation of human products, such as
political parties or leaders, into supra- or non-human products; the humanly made world is
explained in terms that deny its human social production (p. 89). One of the characteristics of
fundamentalism as we have observed is absolutism. Thus transforming human products into
supra or non-human products is to make them and their decisions and actions absolute. To
locate Mugabe within the cosmic frame of reference is to make his decisions and actions and

those of ZANU PF ultimate. To question him would be to question God. In doing this,
instrumentalist nationalism becomes a fundamentalism.
Religious organizations sympathetic to ZANU PF, especially mainline church leaders,
apex bodies, and African Independent Churches, likened Mugabe to the biblical Moses, who
delivered people to the Promised Land. His leadership was depicted as an apocalypse, the
fulfillment of a divine prophecy. Bishop Mutendi of the Zion Christian Church remarked that
Mugabe was greater than the biblical Moses: “You have managed to do what Moses could not
achieve because Moses did not go with the children of Israel to Canaan, but you were with us
at independence and you are still with us” (Mawawa, 2016). Invoking indigenous religion,
Mugabe was said to be acting in accordance with the demands of the ancestors and obeying
ancestral oracles when he took the land away from white commercial farmers (Mukonyora,
2011, p. 137).
Drawing upon an ideological convergence on Africanness, sovereignty and identity
with Mugabe and ZANU PF, the African Independenct Churches have legitimated Mugabe as
a divine leader. Issues of convergence with the AICs have included criticism of
homosexuality. Speaking at a gathering of vapositori, Mugabe invoked the discourse of
homosexuality: “Homosexuality, sodomy and moral decadence should not be allowed to take
root in Zimbabwe. The church must preach against these vices” (Staff Reporter, 2014). This
rhetoric serves to mobilize the required votes and in the long term it is part of subject
formation in which a particular message is transmitted by an authority to create a constituency
of subjects.
The AICs share with Mugabe’s regime a totalitarian and fundamentalist tendency
(Hastings, 1979, p. 77; Machoko, 2013, p. 4). African churches such as Johane Masowe
WeChishanu (vapositori) became dependable support bases when ZANU PF’s urban support
waned (Mukonyora, 2011, p. 137). They became part of the machinery of nationalism. In
one episode Mugabe, a staunch Catholic, even dressed in the vapositori costume as a way of
identifying with them. During my field research in 2013, in Zimbabwe, I observed that the
vapositori have had seats reserved for them at state functions and line up at the airport to
receive Mugabe on his return from overseas trips. The treatment granted Mugabe is typical of
the treatment given to religious fundamentalist leaders.
The nationalist discourse co-opted some leaders of mainline churches such as Ezekiel
Guti of ZAOGA, who upheld the notion of African liberation, and Rev. Obadiah Msindo of
the Destiny for Africa Network, an organization which was fully funded by ZANU PF and
became its conduit to “sacred power” (Zimudzi, 2006, p. 201). On the eve of the 2013

elections, prophet Wutawunashe, founder and leader of the Family of God Church, endorsed
President Mugabe’s candidacy, describing him as Zimbabwe’s messiah due to his spirited
drive to ensure people have total control over their God-given natural resources (Maponga
2013). In the same vein Anglican Bishop Jakazi, urged his members to vote for Mugabe: “I
want to encourage you to vote for ZANU PF. I am blessing the victory of Mugabe. I call
upon people to choose life and consider the future when they vote in the forthcoming
elections” (Masekesa, 2013).
The Apostles Christian Council of Zimbabwe (ACCZ), a body with direct monetary
support from the ZANU PF regime, was created to house and regulate all 350 apostolic and
Zionist churches in Zimbabwe (Nsingo, 2012). Former Vice President Joice Mujuru was the
matron of this body, despite being a member of the Salvation Army, which is not a member of
the apostolic and Zionist churches. Typical of fundamentalist tendencies, especially
theological innovation, when Joice Mujuru fell out with the Mugabe regime, the ACCZ also
denounced her and a new theology that justified dropping her as the matron was developed.
The leader of ACCZ Bishop Johannes Ndanga stated:
The patron’s appointment is done to someone who will be representing the president
because he is the one who the Holy Spirit through Johanne Masowe in 1934 said will
lead the nation. When former VP was the patron, she was representing President
Mugabe, so it is now impossible for her to remain as our patron. (Religion in
Zimbabwe, 2014)
In the whole saga leading to her dismissal, Mugabe had accused Mujuru of witchcraft, a
practice which is a gross aberration from Christian principles and practice:
We managed to know what Mai (Mrs.) Mujuru was doing at her house, even
consulting n’angas (traditional healers). Recently she invited two Nigerian sangomas.
We heard they were specialists in the field of witchcraft. (Zimbabwe News, 2015)
While Mujuru’s religious background is something to reckon with, her association with
ZANU PF at the highest level, the Presidium, as Vice President of ZANU PF and of
Zimbabwe, still haunts and taints her reputation as an alternative candidate and pillar of hope
for Zimbabwe.
To put the discussion into perspective, it must be not be overlooked that religious
organizations also have the potential to deploy religion to challenge the system rather than
subjecting citizens. Groups such as the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance and Churches in
Manicaland represent religio-political groups that have challenged the government in postcolonial Zimbabwe (Tarusarira, 2016). In the second half of 2016, Zimbabwe witnessed a

notable development when Pastor Evan Mawarire started a popular movement, “#ThisFlag,”
which challenged the government of President Robert Mugabe to deliver the promises it made
in the 2013 election. It was not difficult for Mawarire’s movement to spread as it rode on the
back of the national discontent regarding the economic meltdown the country was, and is still,
experiencing. The #ThisFlag movement joined forces with citizen groups and effected a
national shut down on 6 July 2016 through the use of social media, especially Facebook.
Mugabe’s regime descended on Mawarire, but failed to trump up treason charges against him.
He thus fled to South Africa and subsequently to the United States of America. One ZANUPF functionary and Member of Parliament denounced him in a slogan, saying, “Down with
Mawarire! Down with those who read the Bible upside down!” (Rupiah, 2016). This violent
response by the government to religious organizations critical of it, threaten peace and
reconciliation in Zimbabwe. However, the emergence of such organizations provide a
window of hope. Following Mawarire’s #ThisFlag, organizations such as
Tajamuka/Sesijikile and other citizens groups emerged and staged protests and
demonstrations. The protests shook the government such that it banned protests for certain
periods by invoking the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) (Mhofu, 2016). Demonstrated
is the strategic potential for religious and non-religious groups to join and confront ZANU
PF’s instrumental nationalism.
Fundamentalism is characterized by an emphasis on one center of power. Witnessed
is the effort to make Mugabe the center of power and authority. At the human level, he is the
visible Supreme Being in the order of divinity. It is no wonder that top musician Alick
Macheso, when invited to perform at a state event, had the opportunity to get a handshake
from Robert Mugabe. He went down on his knees, bowed down, his head touching the
ground, when he raised his head, tears could be seen running down his cheeks (Showbiz
Reporter, 2012). Those who have been expelled from the party in the factional fights linked
to the succession debate within ZANU PF, left the party singing praises for Mugabe and the
party. None of them, including the former Vice President Joice Mujuru, have uttered any
word against Mugabe, but only praise. While some might attribute that to fear, this article
argues that it is instead a sense of passionate attachment with Mugabe and the party.
The so-called one million man march in May 2016, in support of 92 year old Mugabe
as the party’s Presidential candidate in 2018, was organized by the youths and also exposed
how the majority of its supporters are poverty-stricken, especially those in the rural areas, but
continue to support Mugabe and ZANU PF. The one million man march gobbled an
estimated $600,000 (USD) at a time when hospitals are dilapidated and without drugs. After

the march some of the party enthusiasts were left stranded in the cold with no transport to take
them to their homes. Hordes of hungry and desperate party followers were seen milling
around dejectedly after being left on their own (Mashaya & Kamhungira, 2016)—an event
that happens repeatedly after ZANU PF rallies. With this treatment one wonders what in the
first place prompted them to go to the march. It is not the abandonment and ill-treatment with
which I argue that these participants willingly went to the rallies, but that the effervescence
observed during the marches and rallies makes it difficult to think the participants were forced
to attend. This challenges the received orthodoxy that well-written manifestos, also called
programmatic agendas, are the key to mobilizing political support. When political parties
appeared, they were based on ideology or programmatic agendas (Fukuyama, 2014). In the
election of 2013, ZANU PF had a well-promoted economic blue print, called
Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation (Government of
Zimbabwe, 2013) which was meant to turn around the fortunes of the economy—the most
referenced promise being the creation of two million jobs. During the one-million man
march, Zimbabwe was experiencing a liquidity crunch, and about 100 000 jobs had instead
been lost since the 2013 election, according to Former Finance Minister Tendai Biti (New
Zimbabwe, 2016). Despite that, thousands turned up for the march.
Instrumentalist Nationalism as a Fundamentalist Discourse
The discourse of rituals in politics can help us further understand how instrumentalist
nationalism is fundamentalist in Zimbabwe. Applying this concept helps to show how the
process of subject formation is undertaken. Rituals are defined as symbolic behavior that is
socially standardized and repetitive (Kertzer, 1988, p. 9). Through rituals, politicians try to
assert, and sometimes make divine, their right and authority to rule as well as carve out a new
basis of political allegiance. Rituals provide a way to understand what is going on in the
world that must be drastically simplified if it is to be understood (Kertzer, 1988, p. 9). When
ZANU PF was at its lowest, as from 2000 to the present, it simplified its instrumentalist
nationalism mantra through propagandist and particularistic media jingles that were repeated
over and over in both electronic and print media. This impression was so impactful that it
seems to have penetrated into the minds of the people, whom we observe dedicating their time
and energy for ZANU PF activities and making the propagandist rhetoric their basis of
arguments in defense of their political party. The messages were crafted so as to subject a
people, create a particular mood in the country, and influence an attachment with the ruling
regime. Messages meant to “help Zimbabweans understand what was going on in the world”
included The land is the economy and the economy is the land; Zimbabwe will never be a

colony again; Our land is our prosperity; Third Chimurenga; Chave Chimurenga (It’s now
war), amongst others. An estimate made in 2003 for one music jingle titled Chave
Chimurenga showed that it was being played approximately 288 times a day on the four
national radio stations, which amounts to 8,640 times per month. It was aired on television
approximately 72 times a day, which amounts to 2,160 times a month (Sibanda, 2005). Social
science tells us that repetition of propaganda can be devastatingly effective (Chikwanha,
Sithole, & Bratton, 2004).
Fundamentalism is related to members associating with their own and avoiding
outsiders. To ensure adherance, groups may develop particular modes of dress, behaviour,
and speech, which are enforced in their communities sometimes violently, as noted
previously. ZANU PF developed new campaign material in various forms—shirts, skirts, tshirts, and flags. As my observation, during the election of 2008 and 2013, it became
common to keep a small Zimbabwean flag which got conflated with the ZANU PF flag, due
to their similar colours, for purposes of safety. With that flag one would be shielded from
attack by ZANU PF enthusiasts. Thus, national and ZANU PF symbols got conflated. At
police roadblocks, suspicion of belonging to the opposition was highly expected if one’s car
did not have a hanging Zimbabwean or ZANU PF flag.
In terms of speech, there were slogans associated with the party and its President. One
was expected to be conversant with these, and failure would intimate that one belonged to the
opposition. ZANU PF’s culture of slogans derives from the liberation war and as Hove
(2013) points out:
Liberation-war guerrillas were masters of sloganeering. The so-called pungwes or allnight political education meetings in the mountains were nothing more than chains of
slogans, extolling the unproven virtues of Zanu. They were also used as a prelude to
the cold-blooded murders of those condemned by Zanu kangaroo courts as witches,
sellouts and political opponents.

Invariable and repeated wearing and carrying of party regalia ensured that the party
ideology and identity slowly sunk into individuals before their realization they would be
victims of subject formation, with a passionate attachment even to their source of domination.
In repeating these gestures, the masses found themselves in what Butler (1988) called
performativity, meaning they performed and internalized the identities imposed by ZANU PF
until it became their second nature or lived subjectivity (pp. 204-205). The materials were
accompanied by rallies and galas whose rationale derived from the pungwes. Galas and

musical bashes were organized on significant days such as the Independence Day, the heroes
and defense forces days, as well as days in honor of the late ZANU PF heroes. The type of
music, language and themes were linked to the ruling regime. Thus musicians sympathetic to
the regime were invited to perform.
Music is not solely a tool of social entertainment. As Koelsch (2010) has noted, music
has an inherent ability to evoke powerful emotional responses in listeners (p. 131).
Baumgartner,Lutz, Schmidt, and Jancke (2006) observed that evoked emotions impact and
enhance the subjective experience of other sensory stimuli (p. 151) and more closely, music
releases oxytocin, and research has shown that oxytocin is critical to generation of trust and
affiliation (Missig, Ayers, Schulkin, & Rosen, 2010, pp. 2607-2016). The preceding renders
music a powerful social tool. No wonder musicologist Cross (2003) asserts that “music is not
only sonic, embodied and interactive; it is bound to its contexts of occurrence in ways that
enable it to derive meaning from, and interactively confer meaning on, the experiential
contexts in which it occurs” (p. 108). Music elicits inexplicable emotions of joy, awe and
ecstasy, while increasing trust, empathy and cooperation among participants. In the case of
ZANU PF, nationalist listeners would elicit inexplicable emotions toward, and increase trust,
emphathy and cooperation with, ZANU PF. It is not surprising that composing party songs
became one of the key strategies employed by ZANU PF’s political commissars. In 2001, the
late ZANU PF’s national commissar and elections director Elliot Manyika recorded the album
Mwana Wevhu (Son of the Soil) in which he sang the lead vocals on the “hit” song Nora, a
praise song for Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe. He also composed an eight track
called Zimbabwe 2005 for ZANU PF’s election campaign. Some of his songs celebrated
Black independence, while in others, the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai is accused of selling
out to the former colonial power, Britain (Sibanda, 2005). Webster Shamu, ZANU PF’s
political commissar, also recorded a CD Nyatsoterera (listen carefully) that he composed with
a group called Mbare Chimurenga choir (Sibanda, 2008). It has become a tradition to belt out
this music at political rallies.
The deployment of songs in the political discourse derives from the colonial times.
Chikowore (2015) observes that during the colonial era, Africans deployed songs as cultural
expressions to fight war over their being, to regenerate their selfhoods, and to strive for
liberation from the confinements of subjugation. These songs, as Chikowore (2015) notes,
emerged from the village and urban-class African consciousness. It is therefore not surprising
that songs with a similar framework are deployed in pursuit of instrumentalist nationalism in
post-colonial times.

Music embedded in religious rituals transforms the ordinary into the extraordinary,
thereby laying the foundation for the creation of the sacred. No wonder religious songs have
been imported into the political discourse in Zimbabwe (Chitando, 2002). The deployment of
music through musical galas and musical jingles is not for mere entertainment, but is a central
part of the fundamentalist nationalist project of ZANU PF. It creates a fundamentalist mind,
and the articulated impact of music dovetails with the characteristics of fundamentalism. All
these fundamentalist initiatives had emotional and psychological functions, an aspect that is
under-researched. Thus huge loud speakers that belt out nationalistic music have become a
common feature of ZANU PF’s political rituals. To this music dance ordinary people, with
little to gain from the political discourse.
Those deploying political rituals capitalize on the fact that politics is not merely about
material interest, but also producing and using symbols. Kertzer (1988) stated, “It is through
symbols that people give meaning to their lives; gain full understanding of political
allegiances. The power of the ritual stems from its psychological underpinnings. A ritual also
serves to link the individual to society” (p. 10). To understand how the various activities
described above, undertaken by the ZANU PF, are fundamentalist and subsequently tools for
subject formation, we need to understand participation in rituals. Creating the right protocol,
behaviors, sitting arrangements, speeches, song, dance, and dressing (think campaign regalia)
in everyday politics at rallies and musical bashes, “involves physiological stimuli, the arousal
of emotions; rituals work through the senses to structure our sense of reality and our
understanding of the world around us” (p. 10).
Furthermore the psychological attributes of ritual are evident in a frequently dramatic
character. Ritual provokes emotional response, thereby prompting people to do things they
never thought they could do, or to develop a particular fixed position or disposition about
certain issues, as well as being ready to act in certain ways they would otherwise not do had
they not been part of the ritual (Kertzer, 1988, p. 10). Fundamentalists are clear about the
enemy. There is no compromise and their mission regarding the enemy is simply to eliminate
the enemy who is the incarnation of the devil. The various nationalistic activities have
created a sectarian understanding of the nation Zimbabwe that is not shared by all
Zimbabweans, but one that serves a particular section of society and consequently results in
conflict and violence in the country. It has created a people that act in ways that are divisive.
The case of the aforementioned National Youth Service graduates who underwent
fundamentalist training at youth training camps and then perpetrated violence in support of
ZANU PF, proves the point.

Instrumentalist nationalism in the case of Zimbabwe is meant to link the individual
with the society or community that is created or imagined (Anderson, 1991) by ZANU PF
through its nationalism project. Some may consider patriotism a virture, but the problem lies
in that the love and commitment for country in Zimbabwe has been conflated with the love
and commitment for ZANU PF. Differently put, patriotism has been conflated with
nationalism, and yet the two are distinct. The nationalist discourse is presented under the
guise of patriotism; yet these discourses are driven by different socio-psychological processes.
Patriotism refers to the noncompetitive love of and commitment to one’s country. It focuses
on promoting the welfare of one’s nation, but is neutral with regard to the evaluation of
others. Nationalism on the other hand is related to the superiority of the ingroup over
outgroups and implies the exclusion or even domination of outgroups. Consequently it is
associated with higher levels of chauvinism, prejudice, militarization, hawkish attitudes,
social dominance orientation, and lower levels of internationalization (Kemmelmeier &
Winter, 2008, p. 863). The preceding narrative on instrumentalist nationalism attests to that.
Experiments have shown that when exposed to nationalistic symbols, individuals are likely to
think and act in ways consistent with the worldviews and values with which the symbols are
associated (Kemmelmeier & Winter, 2008). Thus exposure to ZANU PF’s symbols is
expected to form subjects who think and act in ways consistent with ZANU PF’s worldviews
and values.
Conclusion
Against this background, it can be argued that there still exist people who
enthusiastically, passionately, and emotionally support ZANU PF and its leader, Robert
Mugabe. This is contrary to the view of much of the literature on political practice in
Zimbabwe—that the many people observed as effervescent at ZANU PF’s marches and rallies
are forced to attend, or are lured with benefits such as food handouts (Kriger, 2005). I have
used the concepts of subject formation and fundamentalism here to offer a new explanation
often overlooked in discussing politics in Zimbabwe, thus making a new contribution to the
discourse and literature of political mobilization. ZANU PF supporters have developed a
passionate attachment to the system and its leader. To attribute this support only to the carrot
and stick method in the form of rented crowds, food handouts, coercion, and persuasive
election manifestos is inadequate because in some cases these have been non-existent. As I
have argued, some allegiances have not shifted. This was demonstrated by some participants
of the one million march in support of Robert Mugabe, who were left stranded after the event.
As for the election manifestos, the blue print ZimAsset promised 2.2 million jobs, but instead

people lost jobs. Thus, while there are pull and push factors, there is also enthusiastic and
passionate following without gaining anything from the process. In this article I have argued
that instrumental nationalism—thanks to its fundamentalist character with its subject
formation potential—provides an explanation, in part. The Zimbabwean context as discussed
above has resulted in conflict and violence, which engender the need for peace and
reconciliation. The accentuation of the psychological dimension, exemplified by the
fundamantalist mind, indicates that people act quickly and decisively on the basis of their
emotions, beliefs, and attitudes more than they do on rational reasons presented in favour of a
particular position. To facilitate sustainable peace and reconciliation, the psychological
repertoires need to be given serious consideration. For the most part, conflict transformation
and peacebuilding processes have been dominated by liberalism, which tends to put emphasis
on rationality and detailed treatise at the expense of the workings of conflictants’ beliefs,
emotions, and attitudes. In practical terms, this means that psychosocial methods should be
prioritized to facilitate change of minds and hearts, which are fundamental for sustainable
peace and reconciliation in times of conflict and violence.
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